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Abstract: Multiple philosophical-theological efforts in the last century, from W. Benjamin to J. Caputo,
have been centered on a messianic opposition to normative structures, a challenge that invokes a long
history in the West of breaking down the codes of ordered, civilized and religious society. That such
an apocalyptic fervor is nothing new to the history of theology should not surprise us. What should
surprise us, however, is how infrequently we are able to see the larger pattern behind these particular
movements. Taking up the recent emergence of ‘queer theology’ as the current manifestation of such
a trend, I want to isolate and clarify the theological implications of comprehending the existence of
humanity as a state of constantly ‘being between’. What I argue is that developing a hermeneutics of
eschatology that takes such tensions as foundational rather than merely heterodox indicates that the
opposition of grace and law is to be understood not as a dualism to be overcome but as the structure
of history itself. The question I am posing is this: to what degree does the queering or subversion
of theological normativity, or the development of a ‘theology against itself’, allow us to subvert
identitarian politics and to challenge the social and religious institutions that we are a part of? It is
through the lens of ‘queer theology’ and its questioning of the existence of normativity itself that we
are simultaneously returned to the basic structures that guide human life, while, at the same time,
propelled forward into new configurations of resistance to just such structures. By firmly placing
ourselves within this ‘queer critique’ we see the ‘already-not yet’ tension of eschatological thought
not simply in religious terms, but in ones that reorient our relationship to the political and social
orders of this world, calling for a permanent re-envisioning of norms as the individual—and the
church—are found to be perpetually—and edifyingly—‘against themselves’.
Keywords: queer theology; feminist eschatology; ecclesial dichotomy; antinomianism; transformative
critique; divine grace; Pauline theology; hypernomianism; nihilism; micro-politics
So many philosophical-theological efforts in the last century, from Walter Benjamin to John
Caputo, have been centered on a messianic suspension of normative structures, a challenge that
invokes a long history in the West of breaking down the codes of ordered, civilized and religious
society. Phenomena as diverse as postmodernism, antinomianism and secularization all seem to share
at least this much in common as a ‘family resemblance’: the almost permanent subversion of normative
boundaries. These are equally the traits that draw so much ire from those wishing to give a passionate
and reasoned defense of particular, established traditions. That such an apocalyptic fervor, as I would
term these diverse phenomena (and so, conflating them somewhat in order to grasp what is at stake in
their frequent contemporary, philosophical usage), is nothing new to the history of theology should
not surprise us. What should perhaps surprise us, however, is how infrequently we are able to see the
larger pattern behind these critical movements and so embrace them for what they might really be:
moments of representational re-alignment in service to the continuance of normative traditions and so
a challenge offered for more justice to enter our world.
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Taking up a wide variety of continental thinkers who are often misread as antinomian
(e.g., J. Derrida, J. Caputo, G. Agamben, G. Deleuze), I wager in what follows that the resonance
between such philosophical interventions and a number of commentators on the nature of ecclesial
structures (R. R. Ruether, Y. Congar) is no mere coincidence; rather, there is an alignment of these
various contestations of normativity that has been, and must continue to be, advanced. To further
solidify the main argument of this all-too-brief genealogical sketch of various resistances to normativity,
I address how these strands of contestation coalesce in the recent emergence of ‘queer theology’ as
another possible manifestation of such a trend within the field of theology specifically. In demonstrating
this link, I want to isolate and clarify the theological implications of comprehending the existence
of politics, legal normativity and theological discourse, among others, as states of constantly ‘being
between’ these varied representational polarities. What I argue is that developing a hermeneutics
of eschatology that takes such tensions as foundational rather than merely heterodox—hence not
willing to do away with the traditional structure of existence, but merely to find a space from which
to issue transformative critique—indicates that the opposition of (antinomian or apocalyptic) grace
and (normative) law as perhaps the preeminent dialectic operative within western theology is to be
understood not as a dualism waiting to be overcome, but as the structure of institutionalized history
(i.e., tradition) itself, the theological implications of which we have yet to more fully comprehend.
A first inspection of the short history of contestations of power in the church might begin with the
foundations of criticism located in the transition from ecclesiological to feminist critique as embodied
in the work of Rosemary Radford Ruether. Her first book, The Church against Itself: An Inquiry into the
Conditions of Historical Existence for the Eschatological Community (1967) points directly toward the radical
constitution of the church as a human structure forever critical of itself in order to exist as church in the
first place. Christians, she posits, due to the impossibility of ever fully capturing God’s image in a fixed
representation of some sort, must be permanently engaged in an iconoclastic project that refuses to
‘alienate the reality to which it points’ ([1], p. 220), thus ever expanding its sense of responsibility to
more accurately describe its own failure to adequately describe God’s possible activity and being in
this world. Making connections between the grace offered to the church through the demise of its once
dominant ‘religious culture’ in the West and the need to develop self-critical and self-transformative
ecclesial models in order to ensure that the church might find its path in times of cultural revolution
such as the late 1960s represented, Ruether conjectures how secularism in the modern West presents
the post-Vatican II Catholic Church, in particular, with an opportunity to respond to popular culture
and (dis)belief in a way that it failed to during the Reformation ([1], p. 223). What her focus is squarely
upon, however, is not just contemporary ecclesial forms, but the dynamic that undergirds the Catholic
Church’s sense of self, as much during the Reformation as at its inception two thousand years ago.
At the same time, she aims to detail a latent dynamic inherent to ecclesial structures that undergirds
much more than simply the Catholic Church. She aims for a clearer understanding of how all structures
and traditions, including the generic ‘church’, regard their own sense of normativity, as well as how
such structures are frequently contested.
Making clear that God’s final judgment is reserved until the end of history, and not within history
as we experience it, Ruether is quick to depict a Catholic Church wherein there is as much room
for growth and maturity, the development of doctrine and the reforming of structures as we might
generously apply to current and future contexts as well. Such a disclosure is not, however, cause to
permanently upend all normative measures. In fact, she is clear that the ‘left-wing tendency of normless
subjectivism’ is not the route to take, as it is all-too-quick at times to discard the ‘good, reliable, and
trustworthy norms’ that have been passed down from generation to generation within the Catholic
Church ([1], p. 227). As she rather argues, a hermeneutical tension must be maintained between the
tradition and any challenge to it, but not one that is delivered at the hands of an external critique
alone. The challenge most squarely to be faced is rather one from within, the ‘church against itself’, as
difficult and tenuous as such a position might be to institutionally embody. Hence, to configure things
as such, theologians might begin to speak about differences only in ‘modalities of thought’ and not
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simply in polarized, dualistic and easily politicized ideologies ([1], p. 231). In the radical discontinuity
that is capable of overcoming traditions when they have become ‘a barrier to the Church’s future’,
there is yet too, Ruether reminds us, the chance to reread the sources of the tradition in order to stress
a remarkable sense of continuity at the same time—a genuine and ongoing resourcement ([1], p. 228).
Though such a reading undoubtedly has the potential to affirm the status quo, it is the development
of self-sustaining, critical models of thought that accompany such structures that Ruether is hoping
to emphasize in ways previously neglected. Hence, she tries to emphasize the inherent instability of
institutional order while admitting the need for its preservation.
Her interpretation of these oldest of religious and political dynamics (indeed they are squarely at
the heart of Christianity’s iconoclastic impulses vis-à-vis Judaism, and though she does not take up this
division as being more fundamental), allows Ruether to develop a self-critical model of ecclesiology that
benefits the church even as it seems on the surface of things to divide it. As she will conclude, the church
is ‘against itself’ in two senses, then: ‘The objective historical spirit of the church constantly wars
against the Holy Spirit because its innate tendency as a fallen, objective being is to banish the gospel
and make the endless perpetuation of its own material culture its primary commitment’ ([1], p. 237).
This is in many ways the surest sign of the church’s existence as a corpus permixtum in addition to the
fact that the church will inevitably be tempted at times to prohibit a genuine movement of the Spirit
(of reform then too) in order to protect its ‘material’ existence as a worldly institution. Perceiving the
church as being ‘the eschatological community of the saints’ is thereby an ecclesial image permanently
at ‘war against the historical church as the communion peccatorum’. As she will elaborate on this second
sense, ‘[t]he eschatological community is reborn in history and perpetuates itself only through this
death struggle with its fallen self’ ([1], p. 237). The tension between the historical, material institution
of the church and this ‘eschatological community of the saints’ is unending, and yet this is how things
should be: ‘To be itself, the church must constantly repent of itself, so that it can ever again find itself
as God’s good creation’([1], p. 237).
It is the recognition of this unending ‘war’ of the church with itself that allows Ruether to embrace,
in this early study as in her later work, the radicality of contextual theological positions from within the
church’s oppressed minority groupings who are still awaiting an eschatological moment of judgment
and justice at the hands of God. There are a good many persons marginalized within ecclesial structures
crying out for their voices to be heard, but all-too-often failing to be recognized or received by those
in positions of power capable of granting them such recognition. Immersed centrally within such
ongoing struggles is the eschatological hope of the church to strive for, though admittedly to never
historically exist as, the Kingdom of God. A genuine recognition of this in-built tension is where the
church must seize its foundational impulses and voices for reform, enter into dialogue with such
tensions and often marginalized persons directly and not alienate them further through a defense
of pretending they do not exist or, worse, that they are to be wholly rejected. It is not surprising in
the least then that Ruether’s later movement toward deepening these initial, structural intuitions
concerning the nature of the church was what eventually led to her becoming a prominent exponent
of feminist and ecofeminist theologies [2,3]. These permanently existing tensions within the church,
much as Yves Congar had foreseen in his influential study of True and False Reform in the Church (1950),
are what should shape and guide its structure, not be resisted in a show of force that, in the end, denies
the eschatological horizon of justice that the followers of God continuously clamor for [4].1
1 See also Congar’s practical suggestions for Christian reunion, which are relevant here insofar as they speak also to the
divisions within the Church too, in Yves Congar, Divided Christendom: A Catholic Study of the Problem of Reunion [5]. There is
no doubt, of course, that Ruether’s proposed consideration of secularism as a moment of potential insight for the Church
runs afoul of other readings of secularization as a threat to true reform in the Church. See, for example [6] Avery Cardinal
Dulles, ‘True and False Reform’, First Things (2003. What Dulles does not consider, as many opponents of secularism do not,
however, is the thesis that secularism is somehow yet a ‘gift’ to Christianity that arises from within the Christian tradition
itself. See, among others [7] Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism.
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What Ruether brings to our attention is an unending tension between the historical church and
an ‘eschatological community of the saints’ that allows us to perhaps comprehend anew why there
is a reason that antinomianism recurs historically again and again as an attempt to be free of all
normative, legalistic dimensions of social, political and religious life, but also why it inevitably always
fails to achieve its goals. There is indeed a specific quality about the desire to break through the
confines of a reductionistic moral or legal code undergirding a given tradition or institutional structure
that prompts people to perceive grace as operative entirely beyond all law (and with law here referring
in general to any normative structure, from Torah to contemporary legal frameworks). This is no
less true at the base of Christianity’s stress placed on the experience of grace over Judaic Law as it is
within various smaller movements championing grace alone (and so apart from all law) that appear
repeatedly throughout history. Indeed, this fundamental tension between L/law and grace, love or
Gospel, has motivated a good many Christian efforts to subsist beyond any worldly or even ecclesial
representation. We could easily consider the Reformation itself, and Luther’s being mistaken as himself
an antinomian, as signs of such trends [8].
For some, however, the path of permanent critique such as Ruether raised only grows more
intense over time: Does this grace move beyond or outside of history or is it internal to the dialectics of
historical representation? Moreover, and insofar as it illuminates our understanding of eschatology
in general, is an eschatological dimension of history nothing more than a longing for such a grace
to be permanently present, a state that cannot exist as long as human beings continue to uphold the
normative order of this world? With Ruether’s analysis of how the church, in order to be faithful to
itself, must always yet exist in a manner that is also ‘against itself’, we are perhaps poised to respond
somewhat differently, less polemically, to these questions. In short, we might be able to discern a vision
of eschatology that is capable of bringing our hopes for grace and for justice into the here and now,
into the desires for reform that accompany any institutional, traditional or legal sense of normativity.
In this sense, eschatology might become more visibly what it has always been: not merely a discourse
about ‘final things’, but an impulse for the reform of presently existing structures.
To see this possibility unfold would be in some sense to agree with David Tracy’s critique
of utopian, eschatological and apocalyptic visions. Tracy, in his commentary on the philosophy of
Ernst Bloch in particular (and though expanding far beyond Bloch to encompass general theological
trends), recognizes how the revolutionary spirit for utopian ideals ‘[...] does demonstrate the power
of eschatological and Utopian symbols to negate present oppression and to disclose alternative and
more humanly authentic societal possibilities’ ([9], p. 246). This is the positive power of revolutionary
expectations. It is also the potential power latent behind antinomian positions, or purely negative
models of thought (nihilism) that would seem to advocate the destruction of all structures. It is also,
for that matter, potentially a state of grace lived beyond all normative, even legal, measures. But, as
Tracy neatly discerns, it also expresses a certain ‘Marxist Romanticism’ that fails to address existing
‘infra-structural and super-structural realities’. Such a radical outlook, much as with the radical
‘death of God’ theologians of the 1960s, does not account for the internal and external structural
dimensions of what must remain in place after such radical thinking has been exercised. The ground
may have been cleared, but what remains is uncertain at best once the traditional symbolic networks
are discarded.2 Tracy’s adherence to the Catholic theological tradition and its ability to accompany
while also challenging the traditional network of symbols and meaning thereby becomes a very
realistic depiction of how a revolutionary hope must be maintained alongside traditional institutions,
as Ruether’s study had already indicated.
In some ways, this line of critical inquiry is reminiscent of Charles Taylor’s challenge to modern
atheism, which, he concludes, may have something important to say to humanity in our day, but
2 See the critique levied against such radical theologies in Tracy ([9], p. 32). In another Catholic context, something too of this
critique can also be found in Joseph Ratzinger’s concern surrounding the Marxist messianic hollowing out of Christian
eschatological claims in the modern era. See Joseph Ratzinger ([10], pp. 4–15).
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which has not had the time to construct a meaningful symbolic structure which might give human
beings a sense of purpose or identity [11]. From this point of view, if a radical cry to be free of all
(onto-theological) structure is to be clearly understood as akin to some form of Marxist Romanticism,
theologians might learn to take seriously those ecclesial efforts to take the ‘death of God’ very seriously
and yet to do away entirely neither with the structures of the church nor its symbolizations of God.3
What an authentically ecclesial theology must learn to recognize is the inherently in-built nature of
these radical theologies that will never go away because they are internal dimensions of the church
‘against itself’. The church will always have accompanying it a number of messianic, even apocalyptic,
impulses that champion an eschatological horizon seemingly forever ‘to come’ that yet contains
simultaneously within itself the potential for critically realigning ecclesial representations. This is
simply the nature of how justice enters into our world.
Continuing this line of thought in a contemporary context, one might make mention here of
the work of John Caputo, for example, who follows a certain Kierkegaardian critique of the church
through a Derridean deconstructivist lens in order to speak prophetically about the loosening of
ecclesial-institutional ways of being in the world. What he is after, it seems, is an ecclesial recognition
of the almost permanent subversion of the church’s normative boundaries, something that fits squarely
within the conferences he organized devoted to ‘subverting the norm’ within an ecclesial setting.4
Caputo’s religion, as he described it in a series of recent writings, is a religion of the ‘perhaps’, one
that attempts to elucidate ‘a certain anarche that issues not in a street-corner anarchism or violent
lawlessness, but in a radical, creative, and even sacred anarchy’ ([14], p. 261). It is a ‘nihilism of grace’
in that it disconnects any particularly sought-after goal from its own internally generated critique
of itself in order that an apparent purposelessness—arrived at via positing a self-critique without
a determinate goal in mind—might actually be a chance for faith, or the divine even, to enter into the
lives of the faithful ([14], p. 238). His viewpoint is one aimed at upending normative boundaries, while
also respecting the reality of religious traditions that must continue to exist in some form if religious
desire itself is to survive [15]. He develops, accordingly and in the wake of Derrida, a non-teleological
eschatology that strives for more justice to enter our world. In this sense, an eschatological vision
exists as non-teleological in order to highlight its nature as an internal mechanism for reform, not
as generated with an explicit historical form or goal in mind. For Caputo, as for Derrida, there
is no determinate historical form that such an eschatological striving for justice must take, though
Caputo acknowledges that it must, in the end, be embodied by some historical, material tradition or
institution [16]. The question that could often be put to Caputo’s ‘nihilism of grace’ is therefore whether
or not he sees an immediate benefit in proffering what appears to be a ‘loose’ form of antinomianism
that is permanently uneasy with institutionalized religion, a dispersal of religious traditions and
institutions that would leave religion perhaps somewhat shorn of its content. These charges, of course,
are nothing new to the history of theological thought, which seemingly trades on such tensions in order
to sustain itself as a discourse—a theology ‘against itself’ structurally parallel to Ruether’s church
‘against itself’, as it were.
Caputo’s sensibilities seem to share, moreover, in another philosophical trend worth highlighting.
For some time now, the legacy of the work of Giorgio Agamben has been debated too as yet another
potential antinomian project, one that refuses to concede the worth of traditional or institutional
religious forms, specifically the Christian (Catholic) church, but which steadfastly, albeit subtly, adheres
to a dialectical (hermeneutical) tension between a normative structure (whether in the form of law
or state, for example) and its messianic undoing—which he interestingly conjectures might be what
‘church’ in our world should be [17,18]. What Agamben is certainly hinting toward, at least, is a way
3 More recently, Ward Blanton, Clayton Crockett, Jeffrey Robbins and Noëlle Vahanian have attempted to extend the radical
theology left behind by the death of God theologians in order to think the ‘death of the death of God’ movement and to
affirm a politics as radical as the theology they wish to assert [12].
4 The most recent iteration of this conference, ‘Subverting the Norm III’ was held at Drury University, 5–7 November 2015 [13].
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of reading history, not from the standpoint of a traditional end of time scenario when all things are
finally ‘set aright’, but rather an apocalyptic, eschatological principle that is capable of transforming
normative measures and the way they appear to function for us in the present moment (akin to Walter
Benjamin’s notion of Jetztzeit or the ‘now-time’) [19].
Charles Taylor’s analysis of the general uncertainty and personal anxiety in the ‘age of authenticity’
that roughly characterizes the quest for self-understanding in the mid-Twentieth Century centralizes
issues surrounding gendered and sexual identity as fundamental to the formation of normative
subjectivities and might thereby help us to understand better the repeated deadlock we continue to
face regarding this failure to comprehend how we embody these unending representational tensions.
In other words, we might turn to gender and sexuality as prime exemplars in the late modern period
of where these conversations about normativity and its disruption I have been following have become
privileged sites of contestation. This is the case in many ways because our gendered and sexual selves
are permanently caught between being locations of nature acting upon us and malleable partners in
the self-construction of personal identity. Any potential distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’
identities, as much as between sexual acts, has become the pivot upon which particular cultural and
religious battles have revolved, and it is very much the pivot upon which they still do ([11], pp. 473–504).
By focusing on this terrain in particular, we might be able to gain another vantage point from which to
detect the tension between normative traditions and their resistance.
Taylor’s insight certainly follows closely on the heels of Michel Foucault’s depiction of the
burrowing of a thoroughly modern sovereign power within the very bodies we inhabit, perhaps
the reason we have become overtly (and possibly overly) focused on issues surrounding gender and
sexuality [20]. What Taylor uniquely brings to the fore is a profound meditation, not just on the
centrality of sexuality and gender to modern discourses that struggle to locate how they are embodied,
but also to those theological hopes of possibly going beyond the grace/nature divide, and toward
something like an access to our being that undoes the division itself, somehow bringing grace into
nature and nature into grace. Taylor’s sense of things is that, just as gender and sexuality have been
destabilized in modern times, so too has our understanding of the division that holds nature from grace,
prompting theologians to reconsider a number of normative boundaries as perhaps more permeable
than they had previously been taken to be.
In the history of theological commentary on this division, according to Agamben who parallels
Taylor on this point precisely, humanity is often depicted as wearing grace like a garment, whereas
our nudity reveals the shamefulness rooted in our nature, prompting us to look for the ‘thing
itself’ (the naked body) beneath the layers of clothing we feel we cannot shed (the significance
of representation). I believe that Taylor, read in this light, is suggesting that gender and sexuality in
the modern era are a privileged site for discussing the evolution of theological categories throughout
history, even if we are mainly unaware of such reconfigurations, but also that our changing views
on the theological (and the secular) have altered our views on the body in particular, making the
distinction between nature and grace that much more difficult to ascertain.
Rendering our private, sexual lives as transparent in this ‘age of authenticity’ wherein the
theological no longer holds sway and no longer covers the displays of sexuality that had previously
shamed us, is precisely what appears to those who are religious among us as a blow struck against
a theological way of being in the world, what Agamben calls the ‘theological signature’ that still
guides humankind. What Agamben is trying to steer humanity as a whole toward, however, is a place
wherein we might be capable of perceiving our nudity, shorn of its theological signature, neither as
something sinful or shameful, nor as something inherently part of a sexualized network of symbols,
but rather as the ‘thing itself’ that we have trouble getting ahold of in our world. The frail, vulnerable
and exposed body of the other standing before us is somehow the very thing we are searching for
(the thing ‘in itself’), but which we have such difficulty accessing directly. Such a thing is as difficult
to access as a person without their clothes on walking down a public sidewalk (since the police
generally prohibit such activity). And yet such exposed, precarious bodies do exist around us all
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the time, concealed but present nonetheless—the foundation upon which grace (as one’s clothing) is
conferred ([21], pp. 55–90).5
Following the lead of both Agamben and Taylor on this issue, I want to suggest that pinpointing
the role of sexuality and gender in theological terms today is not simply the exercise of ‘yet another’
contextual theology (e.g., feminist and queer theologies); rather it is a locus which reveals the political
stakes of the theological within the contemporary world.
Perhaps the political is revealed in our theological discussions of the body, its possibility for
a gendered existence and its varied sexual orientations, because there is a particularly equivocal
nature to human sexuality, a point that we seem only recently able to discuss in somewhat forthright
terms. Its equivocal character is perhaps sexuality’s most determinate characteristic. In other words,
human sexuality often does not fit neatly into one category or practice, though, for reasons of social
and political representation, we routinely comprehend it to be much more ‘straight-forward’ than it
really is. Normative representations of sexuality are what we depend on, culturally, socially, politically
and even religiously. Yet the sheer complexity and fluidity of our sexual being actually denies such
simplistic, and reductionistic, categorization. James Alison, for one, has given us a concise formulation
of what such a positioning on the messiness of sexual orientation and his preference to not define it
might look like when he states that
[...] I’m not sure that it is appropriate to spend much time discussing human sexuality.
For to do so is to go round and round forever discussing a very malleable, rather fluid set
of symptoms, rather than engaging in the real discussion about their prior socialization.
The real discussion involves, therefore, our looking at how we talk about things, which is
a very large part of how they are humanised and lived ([22], p. 161).
What Alison discerns at work in the domain of sexuality specifically is how the socialization involved
in our collective talk about queer persons and queer theologies is also inherently a political discussion,
of how we treat persons who ‘defy’ normative categorizations and cultural institutions. He also senses
how what we are after when we talk of our sexual being in theological terms is often something quite
different than what many take it to be. We want to access the human person who is a gift of the divine
in whatever form of being a human person takes—as Agamben had put it, in their nudity. But we are
so overcoded by particular theological signatures that we have trouble seeing the vulnerable body
underneath the garments both society and the church, among others, have placed upon it.
Any talk of human sexual being then is a discussion that quickly overlaps with a number
of contextual efforts to identify and resist the exclusionary tactics that routinely define whatever
mainstream discourse dominates a given field of conversation, and so overflowing the contexts of
gender and sexuality and turning toward any contestation of normative identities. We begin to see
in this analysis too how apparent revolutionary, apocalyptic and antinomian gestures might contain
signs pointing toward a much more hermeneutical approach when we consider their lived, material
conditions—that is, their embodiment. It is in no way surprising, as I will take up shortly, that the
newly burgeoning field of queer theology has had trouble identifying whether or not it is an antinomian
undertaking, or whether queer theology would be truest to itself by rejecting any attempts to render it
as a discernable field within theological study. To ‘domesticate’ queer theology by giving it normative
boundaries and guides would be, according to those who grasp exactly what is at stake here (especially
politically), a betrayal of its emancipatory force and a co-opting of its political identity by forces bent
on restraining its liberatory praxis [23].
Taking a step back from any attempt to discern the ‘true’ nature of one’s sexual and gendered being
can be, somewhat paradoxically, the most direct and practical way to engage the social and political
5 What might be the most fitting symbol of such a struggle to behold the human person in their nudity is frequently captured
in the crucifixes that chose to cover Jesus’ nudity with a loincloth of some sort instead of depicting the radical gesture of his
naked form being exposed in a position of complete vulnerability.
Religions 2017, 8, 44 8 of 16
terrain upon which the rights and privileges of ‘queer’ persons, for example, are contested. This would
be to suggest at the same time that we would be better served in not necessarily, or primarily, discussing
normative sexual models and their ‘deviations’, but rather in analyzing how sexuality is politically
active, socially contested and what the stakes and implications of such postures are in lived, everyday
reality. And yet the problem in taking one’s sexual orientation as a ‘very malleable, rather fluid set
of symptoms’, for many, especially those vested in fighting for the political rights of queer persons,
is that such a recognition risks de-legitimating the grounds upon which one’s rights might otherwise
be guaranteed—any supposed ‘natural’ orientation that often grounds the claim to guarantee one’s
rights (as in ‘natural law’ theories). To claim that sexuality is ‘malleable’, so the fear often goes, might
de-legitimate its ‘natural’ qualities and thereby open the door to more traditional or conservative
arguments that sexuality is merely a ‘choice’ that one makes concerning their sexual orientation,
a choice that could (or should, many would perhaps add) be made in line with a heteronormative
matrix of representations.
The problematic we are faced with here is one of ‘naturalizing’ what was previously seen
as deviant from a given normative understanding of sexual orientation, and thereby revealing to
us the real issue latent behind most political configurations of normativity: the frequency of their
being mistaken as natural and therefore inherently justified in their hegemonic existence. As Dawne
Moon has shown in her sociological study of the reactions to homosexuality among the ‘ordinary’
church-goer, the naturalization of one’s sexuality—whether from a heterosexual or queer point of
view—is instrumental in the politicization of sexuality [24]. Claiming that one’s sexuality is ‘natural’
is often, and quite significantly, the first step toward the legitimation and recognition of one’s sexual
orientation. For many marginalized persons living under the label of ‘queer’ (among other labels),
until their orientation is socially, culturally or legally, let alone, religiously, recognized, they fall under
such labels as ‘perverse’ or ‘deviant’—what Foucault once brilliantly categorized under the heading
of socially ‘abnormal’ [25]—and so their right to a certain ‘fullness’ of life is inherently restricted.
The problem with such a ‘naturalization’ of one’s sexuality, however, and this is the case despite its
seeming necessity in today’s political culture that seeks to forever expand the rights of recognition,
is that such a process does not necessarily dictate that this act either fully encompasses the reality of
sexual orientation, or that it can ever adequately speak for the fullness and diversity of our sexual
and gendered being. This seemingly equivocal nature of our gendered and sexual selves comes back,
as such, to haunt any normative representation we might give of their existence, highlighting once
again the complicated but ever-present reality of the tensions that exist between pre-existing normative
measures and their eventual deconstruction.
Judith Butler has recently commented on the element of choice in one’s sexuality in a way that
might aid our discussion and help us contextualize a variety of debates between normativity and
its resistance. For Butler, such a ‘choice’ in terms of sexual orientation does not negate the ‘natural’
aspects of one’s sexuality, but rather plays a significant role in affixing identity to sexual orientation
as inadequate then as any identity can be (a point no less familiar to Saint Paul than it is to Butler6).
As she describes the political complexity of such identity configurations: ‘I remember being told years
ago that in public I had to say that homosexuality is not a choice. In fact, I think the issue of “choice”
is very complicated when it comes to what we call “sexual orientation”’ ([26], p. 47). Referring to
the work of Leticia Sabsay, Butler goes on to express a good deal of suspicion about our ‘radically
arelational’ categorizations of sexual orientation as they are typically understood (i.e., as seemingly
autonomous categorizations) [27]. Processes of ‘coming out’ in the West, for example, and as she notes,
are tied to particular ideas of ‘free expression’ that can become ‘[...] a way of exporting and imposing
certain first-world conceptions of freedom’s contours’([26], p. 48). Rather than simply rejoice in the
‘naturalization’ of queer sexualities, Butler, in a sense, raises her head above the western political fracas
6 See Galatians 3:28, among other passages, and the commentary provided in Agamben, The Time that Remains [19].
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that routinely follows the politics of disclosing and living one’s sexual identity in order to ponder aloud
what future perspectives might yet hold true for the recognition of marginalized sexualities: ‘At such
moments, we have to wonder what forms of cultural narrowness keep us from asking how norms
that sometimes function in the name of freedom can also become vehicles of cultural imperialism and
unfreedom’ ([26], p. 48). Such dialectical tensions between life-affirming and life-negating normative
representations are nothing new to her cultural analysis, though the relevance to a person’s way of
being in the world today could not be more significant or timely.7
What Butler’s recent theoretical and political interests have been more inclined to focus upon
is actually the crucial issue I am trying to highlight here: the permanent tension that resides within
any given identity and which leaves us somehow without the very identities that we have. In her
preferred terminology, there are only well-placed and open-ended descriptors that defy any sense of
a fixed identity, such as diaspora and dispossession. These are formulations she works out elsewhere
in the context of a long discourse on Judaic ethical traditions, the contested claims of ‘Jewishness’
and the politicization of being Jewish vis-à-vis debates on the policies of contemporary Israel [29].
It is accordingly very interesting to take a look at her more recent reflections on dispossession as
another way in which to think through issues such as personal identity, sexual orientation and the
performance of gender. It is most intriguing, in fact, to posit an analogy between the ways in which
humans tend to render sexuality as either normative or ‘natural’ and her critique of the illegality of
particular political representations (e.g., nation-states, but one can easily imagine too her contestations
of culturally constructed fixed identities, such as with gender) that are ideologically configured upon
an ‘origin’ for the purposes of ‘self-reproduction’ ([29], p. 206). As I wish here to note, this language
not only lends itself toward fathoming the precariousness of human sexuality in general, but it also
provides a viable model by which to link the failure of such representations to present theological
considerations. The way in which such analogous struggles with the configuration of identity today
merge with the dynamics of a church permanently ‘against itself’ signals, to my mind, an opening
up of the conversation that much wider toward embodied issues such as sexuality, and so not as
taking place apart from issues surrounding history and its end, but as another way—an ‘enfleshed’ or
incarnated one, so to speak—to comprehend the stakes of historical representation within an ecclesial
setting and its limits.
Butler’s pressing concerns with politics and the ‘naturalization’ of sexuality prompt me
furthermore to ask in-depth questions that are no less theological than they are political, and which are
central to the overall line of argumentation regarding normativity that I am pursuing, such as: In what
ways are human beings and institutional structures alike forever dispossessed of their identities and
barred from certain acts of normative representation that might otherwise be stubbornly clung to
and eagerly defended? How might such a prohibition of any normative claims, though failing to
legitimate one’s political rights, nonetheless be able to register itself as a general protest to reductive
political formulations that rely all-too-easily upon their ‘natural’ legitimation? And, directly to the
point I am here trying to formulate, might there be gains to be made that resonate very deeply with
a political-theological discourse that recognizes too the merits of ‘another’ form of committed political
action which seeks to deconstruct the normative representation while recognizing its necessity at the
same time?
In light of these questions and Butler’s suggestive comments, I am wagering that ‘queer
theology’—whatever such a thing may or may not be, precisely then allowing for its ambiguity
and (almost antinomian) undefinability to be its greatest strength—is just such a form of this
political-theological thought that might yet provide an alternative way of looking at those theological
practices most needed now as central to theological discourse: that is, how ecclesial structures might
maintain a critical stance that accepts the reality of dwelling as a church forever ‘against itself’, in exile
7 See also the commentary offered in [28].
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and dispossessed of its identity in some sense while yet retaining it at the same time. In other words,
I want to understand better the dynamics that allow us to contemplate ‘queer theology’ as, to alter
Ruether’s formulation somewhat, a form of theology ‘against itself’.
What queer theology embodies at the moment is in many ways an eschatological, messianic
theology that presents its radical challenge to the church as a marginalized voice (or, rather, as a loose
collective of marginalized voices) needing desperately to be heard. Exploring the political consequences
of a queer theology means first asking about its very existence, interrogating its foundations and
determining what shape such a thing has taken already and what course it might take in the future.
In order to perform something like a ‘queering’ of theology, one must first inquire as well if it is
possible to construct a ‘queer theology’ in the singular or multiple ‘queer theologies’? The distinction,
which is often drawn up as a contest between a monolithic, oppressive unity of ‘guild’ Theology and
the myriad, politically-aware, contesting and contested theologies in the plural, each established in
order to challenge such a structural formation [30], yet reveals a fundamental structural element within
the heart of any messianic, eschatological theology that reconsiders the nature of binary oppositions
and their inherently hierarchical matrix of power relations. Queer theologies, much as with other
contextual theologies, thereby seek to ‘queer’ any theology that not only fails to account for the role
of sexuality and sexual orientation in underlying (fundamental) theological premises, but also any
theology that succumbs to binary structural forms of oppression. In this it certainly shares with other
contextual theologies—black, latino/a, feminist, postcolonial, liberation, mujerista theologies—but it
also recognizes how each of these various theologies can themselves all be further ‘queered’ in some
way, so to speak.
On the one hand, then, there is something called ‘theology’ that can be ‘queered’ (or whose
normativity is subverted), even if there is no such monolithic entity called ‘Theology’ that could be
said, historically or conceptually, to be a unified, definable essence. On the other hand, such challenges
to the structural normativity of theological discourses draw attention to a deeper, theoretical issue,
even to the nature of the theoretical itself within the theological. That is, I want to ask, what is this act of
‘queering’—or to borrow Caputo’s phrasing, of ‘subverting the norm’—if not a fundamental political
act that undoes every binary, reductive and ultimately oppressive structure and which thereby reveals
the theoretical foundations of a contextual approach to begin with? What is this act if not a general
(appearing as) ‘antinomian’ or even nihilistic praxis that destabilizes a given structure and liberates
persons within it so that they might envision ‘other’, alternative ways of being in the world, politically,
socially, culturally, economically and religiously?8
From Jacques Derrida to Slavoj Žižek and Giorgio Agamben, contemporary continental theorists
on the nature of the political have sought a place outside of the everyday operations of the political
through the establishment of a messianic politics so that they might find ways to critique politics ‘as
usual’. This is, in many ways, the question lurking behind contemporary political theories that would
press the boundaries of just what constitutes the political in the first place, and what causes them to
draw the criticism that they are dabbling in antinomian thought. Through their reflections on such
a precarious site—what Žižek has called the ‘absent center of political ontology’ [32]—they are often
heavily derided as being at times overly antinomian, neglecting the discourse of true politics, of being
either idealistic or utopian, and yet such work on politics continues to draw significant attention from
those who really are curious as to whether a space apart from or outside of the domain of politics
can be reached precisely in order to critique the political order and to establish just what kind of
a significance such a site holds for the domain of politics proper [33].
The question is particularly heightened, I would add, when one stops to consider from
a theological perspective how the very foundations of the Christian tradition were based upon
a position that sought, not to do away with law, but to fulfill it: to find a place outside of it that yet
8 Gianni Vattimo refers frequently to such a force as a form of nihilism, as does Caputo with his ‘nihilism of grace’ [31].
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respects the existence of law and does not discard it altogether—what Elliot Wolfson has referred to as
a sort of ‘hypernomianism’.9 Politics, as the constitutive domain of law, its rule and its governance,
would likewise be directly implicated in such discussions. It is, of course, no surprise, but also of great
interest, that these very same philosophers speculating on the nature of a realm outside of, but not
wholly removed from, the political have also been fascinated with the theological dimensions of the
discussion, especially in its Pauline form.
Most directly, the question I am presently posing is this: to what degree is the queering or
subversion of theological normativity, or the development of a ‘theology against itself’, a project
analogous to this philosophical quest to stand outside of politics, but also then to critique politics, to
find a platform from which to call the entire edifice of the political and its normative representations
into question, but then also to reroute its most basic coordinates and norms? And, furthermore, to what
degree is such a quest the nature of one’s rootedness in language itself; that which confines humanity,
but which also allows humans to speak if we are ever to be intelligible to one another [35]? It is
with such questions regarding the existence of normativity itself that we are simultaneously returned
to the basic structures that guide human life, while, at the same time, propelled forward into new
configurations of resistance to just such structures.
I find in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s conceptualization of ‘becoming-minoritarian’
a perhaps suitable partner in this conversation, in no small measure because it offers us a model
through which to think the ways in which being a minority group within a larger (major) matrix
of (often oppressive) representations is not something one seeks inherently to ‘overcome’ and do
away with. Rather, the task of a ‘minor’ discourse—what Deleuze and Guattari will call, in the
context of Kafka’s literary production, a ‘minor literature’—is to find ways to ‘unblock’ the static and
cemented flows within a ‘major’ discourse or society. In the context of Kafka’s writing, which inspires
their political theorizing, we can see how even Kafka’s efforts to deal with his oppressive father, the
analogy of power relations they take up, for example, lend themselves to pronouncing an unqualified
political praxis in relation to all normative structures. In their words, ‘The question of the father isn’t
how to become free in relation to him (an Oedipal question) but how to find a path there where he
didn’t find any’ ([36], p. 10). In ways that will resonate a good deal with queer thought in general,
as well as the church ‘against itself’, they look to Kafka’s theoretical substructure in order to see how
‘minor’ discourses might make ‘a paranoid and perverse use’ of what was imposed upon them in
order ‘[...] to escape from submission, to lift one’s head up, and see passing above the shoulders of
the father what had really been the question all along: an entire micropolitics of desire, of impasses
and escapes, of submissions and rectifications’ ([36], p. 10). There is no eschatology premised on
abandoning normative structure altogether, then, but rather of positing an apparent quest for ‘Opening
the impasse, unblocking it’ ([36], p. 10). Though such a process of ‘unblocking’ may in fact sound
remarkably distant from antinomian, eschatological, apocalyptic or queer thoughts in general, it is
to be understood here as a radical departure from the dualistic frameworks that govern normative
representations. The ‘unblocking’ brought into our field of view is one that undoes, or de-territorializes,
the coordinates of the dominant representation.
From this angle, such acts are entirely situated within the politics of normative structures, such as
history; they are, in fact, parasitic upon them, established in relation to them and aimed at altering
their coordinates through precisely such an (also eschatological) ‘unblocking’ of the desires that had
been halted within the ‘major’ discourse. To see things this way is to confirm, as Ahmed has in her
Queer Phenomenology, that the act of ‘queering’ only takes place in relation to established ‘straight’
lines [37]. This is the true ‘nature’ of the act of ‘queering’. In Deleuze and Guattari’s language, the same
principle is more or less manifest: ‘A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather
9 It is not surprising, therefore, that these philosophical interventions have often shared in discussions concerning the
relevance of Pauline thought on the law and its philosophical implications [19,34].
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that which a minority constructs within a major language’ ([36], p. 16). The tools for liberation, in
whatever ‘minor’ context we are given, are those that are found within the ‘major’ language, the
‘master’s’ language even—a point that has not been unfamiliar to those poets who have worked as
Kafka did, in a language that simultaneously oppressed them while also promising them the key to
their own freedom.
The chosen phrasing of Deleuze and Guattari for this process of reclaiming the language of the
‘master’ is de-territorialization, a word that at once indicates its intimate relationship to an originary
‘territory’, but also its defiant gesture of stripping such a territory of its primary (and political) identity.
The act of de-territorializing is an inherently political act too in that it renders the ‘major’ discourse
vulnerable, prepared for re-territorializing, while also allowing the minority grouping a collective
voice it had previously been unable to utilize publicly. They enumerate the effect of such action in the
following manner:
The three characteristics of minor literature are the deterritorialization of language,
the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of
enunciation. We might as well say that minor no longer designates specific literatures but
the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great
(or established) literature ([36], p. 18).
Exhibiting a deep resonance with the theological quest to locate an identity outside of the normal state
of things, that is, in exilic form, Deleuze and Guattari pose the main problem for minority groupings
as such: ‘how to tear a minor literature away from its own language, allowing it to challenge the
language and making it follow a sober revolutionary path? How to become a nomad and an immigrant
and a gypsy in relation to one’s own language’ ([36], p. 19)? The language of exile is chosen as the
identity that is really a flight from identity, a permanent act of de-territorialization that takes from
the ‘master’ what once belonged to them, but which, now, is being carried elsewhere by those on the
margins. The nomad is the one who is permanently tempted to re-territorialize their identity, but who
resists such a gesture in order to continuously ‘unblock’ the flows that have ceased to be productive.
Deleuze and Guattari remind us of the precariousness of a genuine response: ‘Kafka answers: steal the
baby from its crib, walk the tightrope’ ([36], p. 19).
Both Paul Celan and Adrienne Rich, arguably two of the most prominent poets of the last century,
confirmed through their oeuvres that, as members of specific minority groups, they too spoke the
oppressor’s language, but also indicated, at times, that they had to push this language to its boundaries
in order to find a space for themselves and their poetry [38,39]. For this very reason, Celan’s poetry
appears to many as ‘hermetic’ and Rich’s poems search in the ‘wreck’ of language for the ‘thing itself’
beyond all forms of representation [40]. What both poets identified, I believe, was how, as Deleuze
and Guattari frame it in the context of Kafka’s writing: ‘Language stops being representative in
order to now move toward its extremities or its limits’ ([36], p. 23). As we see in the poetry of Celan
and Rich as well, the movement humans make through linguistic representation is one that moves
outward, attempting to go beyond representation, not simply through metaphor per se, but through
the de-territorialization of ourselves (whoever we are), the other who eludes our framing of them,
our own words, and so forth. To borrow from Celan, Rich and from Butler as well, humanity is
thrust into an exile that can only take place within the confines of language. This too, according to
Deleuze and Guattari, was likewise Kafka’s dream: ‘To be a sort of stranger within his own language
[...]’ ([36], p. 26).
There is no doubt that a significant lingering question remains: what exactly would the status
of something like ‘becoming-queer’ or ‘becoming-antinomian’ mean within the context, not only of
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, but also socially, politically, and, most pressing in the present context,
theologically? In what ways would ‘queer’ theology eschatologically haunt the hallowed halls of
‘Theology’, forever disruptive to its attempts to suture its fractures and pretend that it is a monolithic
entity? It is certainly possible, from this point of view, that any attempt to think a ‘queer’ or ‘indecent’
theology that is not dependent upon a heteronormative field of representations would spell out the
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eradication of ‘being queer’ altogether, a dream perhaps as difficult to realize as removing the categories
that fall under the heading of ‘abnormal’ entirely (something most likely impossible to do altogether,
despite its idealistic appeal) [41]. Yet all may not be lost either in suggesting that humanity will never
be able to do away with its categories of the ‘perverse’, the ‘queer’, the ‘deviant’, the ‘antinomian’,
the ‘minority’. To suggest as much is to suggest that such eschatological, messianic thoughts, insofar
as they must always represent those who ‘lose’ to the system, structure, institution, representation or
law, would have in some ways already ‘won’ merely by existing (by being seen or recognized) in the first
place [42]. Though such a recognition will always run the risk of becoming conscripted into a more
normative order, there is yet too in such possibilities the chance for the ever-incremental growth of
justice to be displayed at the same time, as Butler had remarked earlier. Though there will always be
an undeconstructible element within justice, as Derrida had noted more than once, any normative
structural order will always stand open to its own deconstruction precisely because it is an embodied
position within history. This is, in short, the cost of our linguistic, representational and political being
in the world.
The way I have been framing this discussion on the nature of normative representations and
their opposition (no matter whether labeled as postmodern, antinomian, queer, revolutionary, utopian,
secular, messianic and so forth) opens us up to another question as well, one that I am posing is as
central to the dialectics of history and any formulation of its supposed end as it is to the normative
portrait of Christianity that the West has received: the relationship between law and grace (or love).
To speak of the tension between law and grace not simply in religious terms (though this of course
must also be done), but in ones that reorient our relationship to the political and social orders of this
world is very much the terrain that I wish to ascend to, and taking a look at the ways in which this
relationship has played itself out in modernity might assist us in comprehending the exact stakes of
this seemingly unending debate.
The identification of an eschatological, messianic community within the church that is at once
‘against’ the church, while also being at the same time a testament to its existence, is the minimum
definition of what Christianity has been calling for since its Pauline formulation so long ago: that
there is no division between Jew and Gentile (the ethnic/racial and cultural divide), male and female
(the gendered and sexual divide) and slave and free (the economic and social divide) insofar as all
identities are divided already from within, into the flesh/spirit dichotomy that undoes any previously
established identity. It is thus no longer an identity, but a ‘condition’, as Butler puts it, that brings
together people from all walks of life.10 It recognizes the existence of a ‘precariat’, or precarious
social grouping that now moves history to the center stage while simultaneously appearing to many
to be outside the normative order, an ‘abnormality’, deviance or subversive element that threatens
established order [43]. It also promotes new forms of intersubjectivity that call forth new types of
interreligious understanding at the same time:
Precarity is the rubric that brings together women, queers, transgendered people, the poor,
the differently abled, and the stateless, but also religious and racial minorities: it is a social
and economic condition, but not an identity (indeed, it cuts across these categories and
produces potential alliances among those who do not recognize that they belong to one
another) ([44], p. 58).
Though it may sound strange to suggest that Butler’s insights elaborate a somewhat Pauline theology,
it may be fair to say too that they explode our traditional understanding of theology at the same
time. In other words, I want to suggest that the possibility of interreligious insight flowing from such
10 See [19] for a fuller theoretical unpacking of this ‘division of division’ itself which moves beyond any given identity.
In essence, the emphasis is placed upon Paul’s further subdivision of Jewish identity (the primary social division of
Jew/Greek) through the division of flesh and spirit, thereby undoing the primary division and rendering all subsequent
identities as capable of such a secondary ‘division of division itself’.
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a kenotic state of precarity is something that is only possible through its foundation in a church ‘against
itself’, the precise formulation necessary for a critical, self-dispossessed identity that is thereby able
to exhibit new forms of openness to the O/other who may be the religious other, God or a sense of
otherness within the sameness of the self.
To grasp this state of things is to comprehend the only apparently antinomian, but always
eschatological perspective that unites us outside of normative identities at the same moment that
it reforms the institutions that all of humanity dwells within. To suggest that this is at once both
a theological force while it is also that which exceeds the boundaries of theology altogether is
precisely why it illuminates a theology ‘against itself’ that cannot be ignored.11 A hermeneutics
of eschatology that takes seriously the interplay between the idea of reform and the material
conditions of existence—history, or the autobiographical—is one that opens up to a permanent state of
‘being between’ (the ‘metaxological’), as William Desmond has described our existence. From such
a perspective, there is a hyperbolic sense of transcendence locatable within the fundamental porosity
of our being, one that opens humanity up to what lies beyond at the same time as each of us are firmly
grounded in our being [46]. This hermeneutics of eschatology, of ‘being between’ the end and the
present moment, becomes a non-teleological impulse for reform that admits the necessity of structural
forms at the same time as it seeks to develop a self-critical mechanism that constantly challenges and
overturns facets of institutional dwelling—what Althaus-Reid has referred to in the context of queer
theology as the formation of a ‘critical bi-sexuality’ [47]. There is no doubt that such a state of ‘being
between’ constitutes a form of failure in that it never accedes entirely to either side of an identitarian
spectrum of social, cultural, religious, political or economic identities. But it is precisely this failure,
this sense of never arriving on time to our intended destination that makes the human person exactly
what it is. We are constantly caught between law and grace, unable to choose one over the other or to
easily suture them together—this is the dialectical nature of humanity’s historical being in this world.
Attempting to stand, as the poet Eavan Boland puts it, ‘outside of history’ in order to see these tensions
for what they are is not our fatal flaw—it is the condition of our being who we are.
There are outsiders, always. These stars—
these iron inklings of an Irish January,
whose light happened
thousands of years before
our pain did: they are, they have always been
outside history.
They keep their distance. Under them remains
a place where you found
you were human, and
a landscape in which you know you are mortal.
And a time to choose between them.
I have chosen:
out of myth into history I move to be
part of that ordeal
who darkness is
only now reaching me from those fields,
those rivers, those roads clotted as
firmaments with the dead.
11 I would argue that there is a certain resonance here with the eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann [45].
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How slowly they die
as we kneel beside them, whisper in their ear.
And we are too late. We are always too late ([48], p. 50).
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
References and Note
1. Ruether, Rosemary Radford. The Church against Itself: An Inquiry into the Conditions of Historical Existence for
the Eschatological Community. New York: Herder & Herder, 1967.
2. Ruether, Rosemary Radford. Sexism and God Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993.
3. Ruether, Rosemary Radford. Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing. New York: HarperCollins, 1992.
4. Congar, Yves. True and False Reform in the Church. Translated by Paul Philibert. Collegeville: Michael Glazier, 2010.
5. Congar, Yves. Divided Christendom: A Catholic Study of the Problem of Reunion. Translated by M. A. Bousfield.
London: Centenary Press, 1939.
6. Dulles, Avery Cardinal. “True and False Reform.” First Things, August 2003. Available online: https:
//www.firstthings.com/article/2003/08/true-and-false-reform (accessed on 20 March 2017).
7. Siedentop, Larry. Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism. London: Penguin, 2014.
8. Luther, Martin. Only the Decalogue Is Eternal: Martin Luther’s Complete Antinomian Theses and Disputations.
Translated by Holger Sonntag. Minneapolis: Lutheran Press, 2008.
9. Tracy, David. Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
10. Ratzinger, Joseph. Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life. Translated by Michael Waldstein. Washington: Catholic
University of America Press, 1988.
11. Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007.
12. Blanton, Ward, Clayton Crockett, Jeffrey W. Robbins, and Noëlle Vahanian. An Insurrectionist Manifesto:
Four New Gospels for a Radical Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.
13. “Subverting the Norm III: Political Perspectives on Postmodern Theology & Church Practice.”
Available online: https://subvertingthenorm.wordpress.com (accessed on 20 March 2017).
14. Caputo, John D. The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.
15. Caputo, John D. On Religion. London: Routledge, 2001.
16. Caputo, John D. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1997.
17. Agamben, Giorgio. The Church and the Kingdom. Translated by Leland de la Durantaye. New York: Seagull, 2012.
18. Zartaloudis, Thanos. Giorgio Agamben: Power, Law and the Uses of Criticism. London: Routledge, 2010.
19. Agamben, Giorgio. The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. Translated by Patricia Dailey.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
20. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction. New York: Vintage, 1978.
21. Agamben, Giorgio. Nudities. Translated by David Kishik, and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2011.
22. Alison, James. Undergoing God: Dispatches from the Scene of a Break-In. London: Bloomsbury, 2006.
23. Wiegman, Robyn, and Elizabeth A. Wilson. “Introduction: Antinormativity’s Queer Conventions.” Differences
26 (2015): 1–25. [CrossRef]
24. Moon, Dawne. God, Sex, and Politics: Homosexuality and Everyday Theologies. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2004.
25. Foucault, Michel. Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975. Translated by Graham Burchell.
New York: Picador, 2003.
26. Butler, Judith, and Athena Athanasiou. Dispossession: The Performative in the Political. Cambridge: Polity, 2013.
27. Sabsay, Leticia. Las Normas del Deseo. Madrid: Ediciones Catedra, 2009.
28. Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
29. Butler, Judith. Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
30. Taylor, Mark Lewis. The Theological and the Political: On the Weight of the World. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2011.
31. Vattimo, Gianni. The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture. Translated by
Jon R. Snyder. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
Religions 2017, 8, 44 16 of 16
32. Žižek, Slavoj. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London: Verso, 1999.
33. For more on this, see my article, Dickinson, Colby. “What Christians need no longer defend: The political
stakes of considering antinomianism as central to the practice and history of theology.” Crisis and Critique
2 (2015): 115–49.
34. Wolfson, Elliot R. Open Secret: Postmessianic Messianism and the Mystical Revision of MenahemMendel Schneerson.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
35. Franke, William. A Philosophy of the Unsayable. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014.
36. Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Translated by Dana Polan. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
37. Ahmed, Sara. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
38. Rich, Adrienne. The Will to Change: Poems 1968–1970. New York: W.W. Norton, 1971.
39. Celan, Paul. Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan. Translated by John Felstiner. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.
40. Colby, Dickinson. Words Fail: Theology, Poetry, and the Challenge of Representation. New York: Fordham
University Press, 2016.
41. Althaus-Reid, Marcella. Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender and Politics. London: Routledge, 2001.
42. Halberstam, Judith. The Queer Art of Failure. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.
43. Lorey, Isabell. State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious. London: Verso, 2012.
44. Butler, Judith. Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015.
45. Moltmann, Jurgen. Theology of Hope. Translated by James W. Leitch. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993.
46. Desmond, William. God and the Between. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008.
47. Althuas-Reid, Marcella. The Queer God. London: Routledge, 2003.
48. Boland, Eavan. “Outside History.” In Outside History: Selected Poems 1980–1990. New York: W.W. Norton, 1990.
© 2017 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
